Amends the city charter so that members of the Board of Supervisors and the mayor cannot serve for more than two four-year terms over their lifetimes.
This measure would amend city charter sections 2.101 and 3.101 to limit members of the Board of Supervisors to no more than two four-year terms in their lifetimes. The lifetime term limit would also apply to the office of the mayor. The measure would not apply to other citywide elected offices, including the district attorney, city attorney, treasurer, sheriff, public defender, and assessor-recorder.
In November 1996, San Francisco voters approved Proposition G, which reinstated district-based elections for the Board of Supervisors, to take effect in 2000. Prop. G also established term limits for supervisors: no more than two consecutive four-year terms, with eligibility to run again after a four-year break from office.
Prop. G limits consecutive service but does not cap total lifetime service. As a result, a former supervisor or mayor may return to office after sitting out for one full term. Only one individual serving on the Board of Supervisors since this measure was passed successfully returned to office after this break, serving two terms from 2001 to 2009 and two additional terms from 2015 to 2025.
The proposed measure was led by a coalition through the SF Young Democrats, and the legislation was introduced by Supervisor Bilal Mahmood to end a “boomerang” provision for term-limited politicians, encourage participation in politics by younger candidates, and limit money and network influence in elections. The underlying theory is that limiting lifetime tenure will lower structural barriers to entry, create more competitive elections, and open the door to new ideas and candidates.
The Board of Supervisors voted 7–4 to place the measure on the ballot. The measure requires a simple majority (50% plus one vote) to pass.
The equity impacts of this measure are unclear, and research on term limits yields mixed findings.
On one hand, longer terms tend to favor incumbents with long-standing political networks, fundraising capacity, and name recognition. These advantages can disproportionately benefit older, wealthier, and better-connected candidates. By guaranteeing leadership turnover, the measure could create more regular openings for younger candidates, first-time officeholders, or candidates from communities historically underrepresented in city government.
On the other hand, lifetime term limits can also restrict voter choice, particularly in districts where communities have successfully elected representatives who reflect their lived experience and advocate effectively on their behalf. Preventing voters from re-electing experienced and trusted leaders may disproportionately affect communities that rely on their known representatives to navigate complex city systems or to maintain political influence.
Additionally, reduced tenure can limit elected officials’ ability to build the expertise, institutional knowledge, and long-term relationships needed to advance their policies. Inexperienced officeholders may become more reliant on unelected actors, such as lobbyists, consultants, or senior staff, whose perspectives and incentives may not align with those of their constituents.
San Francisco already has term limits. The existing limits balance the goals of reducing incumbency advantage and preserving voter choice. Lifetime bans permanently remove voter choice to elect representatives, and stripping that choice should require a more deliberate and robust process, which this measure did not undergo.
While term limits can increase competition and reduce incumbent power, this measure is unlikely to achieve these objectives on its own and may produce unintended negative consequences. Term limits alone do not fully address the structural factors that shape political power and electoral outcomes.
Additionally, while regular turnover can promote competition, it may limit elected officials’ ability to build long-term expertise, particularly in a city with a complex governance structure like San Francisco. The rarity of political candidates returning after a break in service suggests this measure is designed to address a problem that barely exists.
For these reasons, this measure is not a comprehensive solution to the challenges of incumbency power, electoral competitiveness, and equitable representation. Achieving the desired outcomes of generating new ideas and leaders requires reform related to campaign finance and pathways for political leadership development.