MUNI’S BILLION DOLLAR PROBLEM

To become the transit system that San Francisco needs, Muni needs more revenue.

Adopted by the SPUR Board
January 18, 2006

Released
February 28, 2006
San Francisco Planning and Urban Research Association
This article is available by PDF here.

Muni’s fiscal crisis

Muni is in the midst of a financial crisis. For the last five years, Muni has been able to patch over its
structural deficit, primarily via a combination of one-time revenues, belt tightening, fare increases, and
service cuts. This year, an improving economy and more one-time windfalls may get Muni through
another year, but these short-term solutions do not address Muni’s real long-term issue:

If Muni’s structural deficit is not addressed head-on, in the years to come Muni may
have no choice but to increase fares and cut more service.

This scenario is unacceptable: Muni needs to improve dramatically, not simply perpetuate the
status quo. To make Muni the first-class transit system that San Francisco residents can rely on,
City and MTA leadership must chart a course that will allow Muni to escape from its downward
spiral of fare increases, service cuts, and dwindling ridership.

A large part of the solution is to reduce Muni’s costs by changing how the Municipal Transportation
Agency (MTA, the organization that manages Muni and the Department of Parking and Traffic)
allocates right of way, manages our streets, and operates Muni so that it can be significantly faster,
attract more riders, and become more productive. These cost-saving measures were discussed in detail
in the September 2005 SPUR Report.¹

But no matter how effectively Muni improves its productivity, it still needs more money. To operate
the improved transit system San Francisco needs, SPUR estimates that through 2015 Muni must find
between $284 and $929 million of additional new revenue above and beyond its current sources.² The
more Muni increases its productivity, the less additional revenue it will need to find. By aggressively
improving Muni’s quality of service to improve its productivity, MTA and City leadership could save San Francisco taxpayers $645 million through 2015 (the difference between finding $929 and $284
million of additional revenue needed by Muni).

The financial needs in this report are based on SPUR’s vision for 2015: less congestion in San
Francisco and dramatically improved Muni.

Better Muni is not a goal in and of itself, rather it is a means to an end: a more livable, sustainable,
economically-productive city for all San Franciscans. Finding the money and making the changes
necessary to dramatically improve Muni will reduce congestion, enable economic growth, reduce
pollution, promote social equity, increase public health, and generally improve our quality of life.

The potential consequences of not addressing Muni’s structural deficit are dire. Without reforms and
new revenues, service cuts could become an annual tradition at the beginning of each new fiscal year.
As part of its package to address last year’s budget deficits, Muni cut 7% of its service hours. Daily
riders have felt the pinch, and some have abandoned Muni altogether rather than face more crowded,
less frequent, more expensive service.

It will only take a few more rounds of service cuts to reduce Muni to a transit system of last resort for
those that have no other option. Muni riders will bear the impacts of service cuts most directly, but the
entire city will be worse off as deteriorating transit service increases traffic congestion on city streets
and diminishes our overall economic competitiveness and quality of life.

Muni’s financial problems are not unusual – they mirror the challenges faced by all labor-intensive
industries in America over the last decade. Muni’s structural deficit is the result of stagnant revenues
being outpaced by the rapidly rising costs for retirement and health benefits, worker’s compensation,
materials, and fuel. Its structural deficit will not solve itself. And, if ignored, it will only get worse.
Addressing Muni’s structural deficit requires a three-pronged approach to aggressively improve
service, reduce costs, and increase revenues:

1. Reduce costs by getting more out of each service hour provided. As a measure of
   transit service efficiency, productivity – the number of people carried for each hour of
   transit service – is the bottom line: how much do you get for every hour of transit service
   provided? Roughly speaking, if Muni increases its productivity by 20 percent, it could
   provide the same amount of service it does today (about 3.5 million service hours
   annually) yet deliver 20 percent more service to riders. In short, by increasing productivity, Muni could provide much more service with about the same number of service hours and employees.
   
   
2. Reduce unit costs by reducing the cost of each service hour. While Muni can reduce its
   costs by getting more productivity from each service hour, it must also reduce the cost of
   providing each service hour (also called unit costs). Currently, it costs Muni about $115
   per hour for a bus and about $200 per hour for a streetcar to operate and maintain our
   transit system. Reducing the cost per hour of service increases the amount of service that
   can be provided with the same financial resources.
   
   
3. Increase Muni revenues. Even with these two cost-cutting strategies, Muni must also
   find new revenue to pay for the number of service hours that San Francisco needs to have
   a truly first-class transit system. The purpose of this report is to estimate how much
   additional revenue is needed, and recommend where this new revenue should come from.
   

Muni has already made some progress on all three fronts. Since 2000, Muni has developed new
sources of revenue, worked with its unions to reduce unit costs, and in January 2006 initiated a process
to rethink how Muni could offer better and more productive service. SPUR applauds these efforts, but
even with these improvements, Muni has a long way to go when cutting costs and raising new
revenues. Moreover, it takes time – up to three years – to plan, approve, implement, and reap the
financial benefits of significant transit improvements designed to increase productivity. Until then,
public transit in San Francisco is on the brink.

Making Muni faster is not a quick fix. Nor is finding additional revenue. Both are essential ingredients
to make Muni a first-class and financially viable transit system. New revenues cannot wait until Muni
proves itself.

Engaged and visionary leadership is needed during this critical period. Voters, transit riders,
community groups, and the business community should hold MTA management, the Board of
Supervisors, and the Mayor (who appoints the members of the MTA Board) accountable for creating a
significantly improved and financially-sustainable transit system.

How much additional revenue?

SPUR used two scenarios for Muni productivity growth to estimate the amount of new revenue Muni
must find. The “status quo” scenario assumes Muni will continue on its current path of planned system
improvements and ridership projections.³ This status quo scenario results in the most additional
revenue that will be needed – $929 million through 2015.

The least amount of additional revenue is required in the “significant improvement” scenario, reducing
the needed additional revenue from $929 to $284 million. This scenario assumes that Muni improves
enough to increase its productivity by 25 percent to 80 passengers per hour by 2015. This is the
ambitious but achievable productivity goal recommended by SPUR that would return Muni to the
productivity it enjoyed until the early 1990s.

Estimates of additional revenue needs in the future should not optimistically assume the best-case
scenario for cost reduction. To make a reasonably conservative estimate of total additional revenue
needs by 2015, SPUR suggests that Muni set as a revenue target the halfway point between the best
and worst case scenario – $605 million of additional revenue by 2015. While the halfway point is an
arbitrary target, it provides a sufficiently aggressive start. In the years to come, revenue targets can be
adjusted upwards or downwards depending on how effectively the MTA improves Muni service,
attracts more riders, raises productivity, and reduces other costs.

Revenue needs of this magnitude will not resolve themselves. We must decide if we will accept more
Muni service cuts, fare increases, and worsening traffic congestion, or if we are willing to pay for the
better Muni service, levels of congestion, and quality of life we say we want.

Evaluation criteria for potential sources of new revenue

In light of its financial crisis, Muni may need to prioritize revenue sources with the greatest revenue
potential and the lowest legal and political barriers to implementation. In a climate of reduced service
and the risk of continued transit abandonment, Muni cannot afford to ignore potential sources of
revenue.

Though Muni’s fiscal crisis may require a more pragmatic approach to finding additional revenue, the
ideal approach is to find sources of new revenue for Muni that also accomplish other long-term policy
goals. Thus, wherever possible, new revenue proposals for Muni should be supported by some
analysis of the broader policy ramifications that show how they advance other City goals. In other
words, the MTA should focus on strategic, not just opportunistic, sources of new revenue. SPUR
recommends that City and MTA leadership use the following criteria to evaluate the net public policy
benefits of potential new revenue sources for Muni:

1. New revenue sources for Muni should support an integrated congestion management program. Under current policies and practices, San Francisco can expect about a 10 percent increase in the number of car trips per day between now and 2025.⁹ Planned transportation improvements over the next 10 years – including the approved citywide bicycle and bus rapid transit networks¹⁰ – will also reduce roadway capacity for automobiles on certain corridors. Moreover, SPUR anticipates that many more transit-only lanes will be included as a crucial part of the MTA’s upcoming plan to improve transit speed and reliability.¹¹
   
   But worsening congestion is not inevitable. San Francisco can make the pedestrian, bicycle, and bus rapid transit improvements that we need without increasing auto congestion by actively managing car trips using price incentives.
   Pricing to manage demand for auto travel would not only optimize revenue (although this would be one result), but would also address two of San Francisco’s most pressing transportation issues: 1) peak period congestion and 2) high demand for the limited parking supply. Some potential sources of revenue could simultaneously advance the robust citywide congestion management program that San Francisco needs.¹²
   
   Adopting a goal of holding car trips at current levels and then implementing policies to achieve that goal would not only benefit Muni, it would help the City achieve its goals for land use, economic development, public health, and environmental sustainability. Less congestion would allow San Francisco to add critically-needed new housing and continue its vigorous economic growth without degrading our quality of life.
   
   
2. New revenue sources for Muni shouldn’t discourage development in dense, transit-rich areas
   where Muni is most efficient.
   From the perspective of regional sustainability and traffic management, San Francisco must continue to concentrate jobs in dense, transit-rich areas like downtown and along the Market Street spine, where local and regional transit networks converge and Muni is most productive.
   
   While downtown employers and developers should pay their fair share, it is counterproductive to discourage local or regional job creation in San Francisco’s downtown. In particular, from a transportation perspective, a new Muni trip by an employee commuting to a low-density outlying development like Executive Park is more costly for Muni to provide than a Muni trip by an employee commuting to Market Street.¹³
   
   Rather than raising the cost of jobs downtown through a higher payroll tax or an across-the-board downtown assessment, the MTA should consider taxing congestion and the sources of congestion. Reducing congestion-related delay represents potential cost savings for Muni and will improve service. Many people support a downtown assessment because they believe that downtown has a greater ability to pay additional taxes. Discouraging auto congestion through pricing measures achieves the same end as a downtown assessment district but without the unintended negative consequences of discouraging development in the most transit rich areas – and has important secondary benefits.
   
   Taxing congestion can take various forms. One is a London-style congestion-pricing program, where motorists are charged a fee for driving downtown at peak travel times.¹⁴ Other possibilities involve demand-responsive parking pricing, a peak period parking surcharge, progressive parking taxation, or increasing the existing commercial parking tax.¹⁵ These revenue ideas have the advantage of not discouraging the creation of new jobs downtown and other transit-accessible locations, which is the greenest place for the city’s and region’s growth to occur.
   
   
3. New revenue for Muni should come from sources that are sustainable in the long term. To stabilize its fiscal position from one year to the next and address its structural budget deficit, the MTA and City leadership should focus on new revenue sources that:
   
   • Are diverse and local. Over reliance on just one or more large revenue streams can create
     major problems during economic downturns or policy changes.
   • Yield revenue annually, rather than just provide a one-time revenue boost. Building budgets around one-time revenue windfalls is not sustainable.
   • Automatically increase with inflation and/or rising costs in order to prevent the erosion of the revenue yield over time. Similarly, fares should be indexed to inflation.
   • Strive for simplicity in administration, enforcement, and collection.
     
     
4. New revenue sources for Muni should come from sources that are fair and equitable. Below are three common approaches to consider when evaluating the fairness and equity of new revenue sources for Muni.¹⁶
   
   One approach to equitably raising revenue for public goods and services is to charge based on the benefit received. The “benefits received” approach includes such revenue sources as user charges, assessment districts, and impact fees. Of course, everybody in San Francisco benefits from a functional and convenient transit system. The most obvious group that benefits is transit riders, but businesses also benefit, and even those who don’t use transit benefit in the form of reduced congestion and cleaner air.
   
   Another approach to equity is to charge based on the cost of mitigating the negative impacts (or externalities) that a particular behavior causes. This approach includes revenue sources that transition the City to charging more of the full social cost of an automobile trip, such as charging market rates for public parking and vehicle impact mitigation fees.
   
   A third approach is to charge based on the ability to pay. This approach prioritizes new revenue for Muni from groups with greater financial resources and would apportion the total burden of the new revenue source differently for different income groups. Examples of the ability to pay approach might include progressive taxation at the local level (similar to the federal income tax) or new fees that apply universally but from which low-income individuals are exempt from paying.
   
   As the MTA seeks additional new revenue, some tradeoffs among these three approaches are inevitable. The important point is that any revenue proposal put forward by the MTA should be supported with a serious analysis of the “incidence” of the revenue source (e.g. who pays and how much). This incidence analysis should account for the financial impacts on those who will pay the increased tax, fee, or fare in relation to the benefits received, the impacts caused, and within the context of overall ability to pay.
   
   
5. New revenue sources for Muni should minimize impacts on low-income, transportation-disadvantaged
   people. The impacts of new revenue sources should not disproportionately burden
   low-income people. When a potential revenue source has significant impacts low-income people, then service improvements should be made at the same time that will have the greatest benefit to those low income populations who typically have limited travel options.¹⁷ While improvements to transit, biking, and walking generally disproportionately benefit the poor and those with fewer mobility options, the MTA should analyze the cost-benefit impacts of all new proposed revenue sources on transportation-disadvantaged populations.
   
   
   Does the MTA Board Have One Hand Tied Behind its Back?
   Under the MTA Charter approved by voters as Prop E in 1999, the MTA Board already has the authority it needs to develop new revenue sources for Muni. In fact, the MTA Board was explicitly empowered by Prop E to put new revenue sources – including taxes and assessment districts – directly before the voters, although they have yet to do so.¹⁸
   
   Thus, the MTA Board already has significant authority to analyze and develop new revenue sources (and to submit those revenue proposals directly to voters), and it should exercise this authority. However, one way of enabling the MTA to optimize existing revenue sources and develop new ones is to provide the MTA Board with expanded authority over elements of the transportation system that are currently under the jurisdiction of the Board of Supervisors.
   
   One example of the MTA’s constrained authority over the City’s transportation system is that while the MTA (under the auspices of the Parking Authority) is able to adjust the rates for off-street parking lots and garages to reflect the differing parking demand in different parts of the city without the approval of the Board of Supervisors, the MTA cannot at its discretion adjust the prices of on-street parking to match higher levels of demand or transit service in different parts of the city. A related example: the MTA also can’t allocate roadway space from on-street parking to more efficient bus-only lanes on key transit corridors without also seeking approval from the Board of Supervisors.
   
   In other words, while the MTA has been given the responsibility for managing transportation in San Francisco and making Muni operate reliably, it has not been given all the tools it needs to do so. Worsening congestion is not inevitable as San Francisco grows. Unlike many transit agencies, the MTA not only operates Muni, but also manages San Francisco’s streets. Thus the MTA is in a position to effectively manage the city’s entire transportation system.
   
   The MTA Board’s authority should be expanded to set the prices for on-street parking and allocate street space for bus-only lanes on primary transit corridors, without needing to get final approval from the Board of Supervisors. San Francisco should follow the lead of other cities in California and nationwide that are attempting to make roadway allocation and parking management decisions based on their community’s long-term policy goals.¹⁹
   
   Giving additional authority over pricing and capacity decisions for the city’s streets to the agency tasked with managing the transportation system is appropriate from a good government and fiduciary perspective, and would allow the MTA to manage parking demand, reduce congestion, optimize parking revenue, and make public transportation faster and more reliable. This proposal would also reduce the political friction surrounding raising on-street parking prices in San Francisco, as was demonstrated during the MTA’s FY 2004-2005 budget cycle, when the MTA Board authorized a $1 per hour increase in parking meter prices but the Board of Supervisors – which must face the voters in their district every four years – refused to approve the MTA’s recommend increase.²⁰

1. Begin immediately. A limited number of revenue sources can be implemented fast enough to start generating additional income for Muni by July, the beginning of its fiscal year. The timeframe for ideas that require voter approval or enabling legislation at the state level is at least a year, potentially more.
   
   Given these lead times, the MTA should accelerate the implementation of any revenue generating changes that require only the approval of either the Board of Supervisors and/or MTA Board. For those revenue sources that require studies or voter approval prior to implementation, the MTA should initiate these studies and start developing ballot proposals immediately.
   
   Good budget news this year is no excuse for City and MTA leadership to rest on their laurels. Any revenue that can be secured this year must be pursued. First, new revenues must fill this year’s budget deficit. But Muni also immediately needs revenue for a “rainy day fund” or to reverse service cuts.
   
   There are a number of revenue sources that the MTA should pursue immediately. These include:
   • Improve enforcement of current rules. Ideas include improving the deployment of parking control officers (additional $4 million per year) and the enforcement of the parking tax (additional $1 million per year). The MTA could work with the Planning Department to start enforcing the prohibition of daily, weekly, monthly, or yearly rates for off-street parking downtown. Besides being a powerful means to reduce congestion, this would generate at least an additional $4-6 million per year.²¹
     
     
   • Increase the rates and hours of on-street parking meters in areas where demand is high in order to ensure 85% occupancy. This would not only increase meter revenue for Muni by about $10 million a year, but would also increase availability of parking by using pricing to more efficiently manage demand. With 15% parking availability, convenient curbside parking spaces would be easy to find.
     
     Availability of convenient curbside spaces benefits motorists because they spend less time searching for parking spaces. It also benefits merchants because customers can more easily find a parking space near their store. Fewer cars circling the block looking for parking means less traffic congestion on neighborhood streets, less air pollution, and fewer bicycle and pedestrian collisions with drivers who are focused on finding an empty space. Demand-responsive pricing also benefits Muni by optimizing meter revenue and improving reliability by reducing double parking.
     
     
2. Dedicate more resources to securing Muni’s financial future. Developing new revenue sources and stewarding these proposals through the City’s sometimes byzantine bureaucratic and political process is time consuming and staff intensive. MTA staff has been working hard on finding additional revenues for Muni, and providing MTA staff with the resources to continue their efforts in a strategic and sustained manner is critical. If the MTA does not have enough staff to dedicate to these projects, it should seek immediately to hire additional staff or employ outside help to bolster its ability to evaluate, propose, and implement new revenue sources or to optimize existing ones.
   
   
3. Balance the next three years’ budgets without service cuts or fare increases. San Francisco cannot afford to run Muni into the ground by continuing to cut service, increase fares, or by deferring needed maintenance. The MTA must reduce costs and use creative financing to avoid disruptive shortterm service cuts or another fare increase. Likewise, the MTA cannot continue to balance its annual budgets by deferring critically-important maintenance necessary to keep the system in a state of good repair.²²
   
   
4. Aggressively reduce costs. Muni should continue to aggressively reduce costs through increased productivity and reduced unit costs. The changes recommended in the service efficiency study that the MTA and City Controller recently initiated must move quickly from the drawing board to the driver’s seat.²³ It is likely to recommend many changes that require very small up front capital investments that will reap large operational savings (and pay for themselves in just a few years). Efforts to work with unions to reduce unit costs and improve service quality should also continue.
   
   
5. Present multi-year budgets. SPUR recommends that the MTA immediately begin to develop three-year and five-year budget forecasts as part of its annual budget process. A multi-year budget forecast using various forecasting assumptions would change the annual budget process from one that often utilizes a patchwork of one-time revenues to one that plans for the reliable revenue necessary to pay for the amount of Muni service necessary to meet the City’s transportation goals.
   
   This in turn would provide policymakers the information they need to develop the future new revenue sources in a timely and strategic manner. In particular, multi-year budgeting would allow the MTA to highlight financial needs that lay just around the bend and – perhaps most importantly – help convince voters of the critical importance of various revenue measures to meet those needs sooner rather than later.
   
   
6. Link financial goals to long-term transportation goals in San Francisco. The financial goals in these multi-year budgets should be driven by a clearly articulated vision for how transportation can improve the quality of life for all San Franciscans and, consequently, how much it will cost to operate the Muni system that we need. MTA and City leadership must help make the case that Muni’s budget needs are related to the amount of congestion we are willing to tolerate, how we want to manage parking, how attractive and convenient we want Muni to be, and how our transportation policies and investments can support our larger social, environmental, and economic goals.
   
   
7. Present multiple budget scenarios. In addition to undertaking multi-year budgeting forecasts, the MTA should continue the practice (begun during the FY 2004-05 budgeting process) of presenting multiple budget scenarios to the MTA Board based on different combinations of revenue options and potential operational savings. This approach allows the MTA Board, customers, and employees to evaluate several budget options, rather than a single “take it or leave it” budget scenario that more often reflects political calculus or the desire to put forward “good news” in an election year rather than an accurate reckoning of the MTA’s true long-term financial needs.
   
   This is not only sound budget-making protocol, but also a good-faith gesture that allows for open dialogue about the inherent trade-offs of various budget options as they relate to the MTA’s (and the public’s) vision for the City’s transportation system.
   
   
8. Create a rainy day fund for the MTA. Public transit agencies need fiscal stability to effectively plan for the future, and to some extent they can provide it for themselves. The MTA should create a rainy day fund as part of a counter-cyclical fiscal policy that will help to buffer ups and downs in its revenue stream, allowing the agency to maintain a functional transit system (and even continue to improve service) during economic downturns or periods of reduced transit funding from state and federal government.
   
   The table of revenue ideas in this report describes revenue sources that could become available within the next four years, provided that MTA and City leadership immediately take the necessary steps.These include: initiate revenue optimization studies, conduct nexus analyses, and develop ballot proposals for November 2006 election.²⁴
   
   Note that all revenue projections in this table are conservative high-level planning estimates based on the best data available to the authors. More thorough analysis should be done by the MTA and partner City agencies.²⁵
   
   This report focuses primarily on potential revenue sources for Muni that the MTA, the Board Supervisors, and the Mayor could implement at the local level. (Exceptions are the handful of revenue measures discussed that would require a change to an existing state law or new enabling legislation at the state level before they could be implemented locally). This focus was intentional, as SPUR believes that MTA and City leadership must take control of the City’s transportation destiny by pursuing immediate implementation of every possible local revenue source, rather than waiting for relief that may never come from the regional, state, or federal level.

Muni is in the midst of a financial crisis. The status quo is characterized by a structural deficit coupled with stagnant productivity that will lead Muni still deeper into the vicious downward spiral of service cuts, fare increases, employee layoffs, dwindling ridership, and worsening congestion.

Why is improving Muni and finding the money to pay for it so important? In the long-term, faster more efficient Muni holds the key to making San Francisco an even better place to live. Better Muni and holding traffic congestion at today’s levels are not goals in and of themselves. Rather, they are a means to an end that help San Francisco accomplish its other goals, whether for economic growth, access to opportunities, public health, safety, sustainability, freedom of mobility, or equity.

Too often, getting around San Francisco is the subject of complaint rather than praise, whether the topic is walking, biking, driving, parking, or taking Muni. We cannot stand by as transportation issues – growing congestion, increasingly scarce parking availability, eroding mobility, lackluster streetscapes – diminish our quality of life rather than make our lives easier, more pleasant, or even more delightful. Something must change and change quickly.SPUR has recommended one course of action for addressing Muni’s structural deficit that would avoid service cuts, fare increases, or deferral of needed maintenance. The revenue ideas it proposes do double-duty: besides providing urgently needed revenue they would be the beginning of the City’s first coordinated and strategic congestion-management program. Less congestion will help San Francisco grow and prosper while simultaneously allowing Muni to operate faster and more reliably. Whatever course chosen by City and MTA leadership, the next few years will require many tough choices. Though difficult, choosing the best new revenue measures to support may be among the easier choices that transportation policy makers will face. More difficult may be the choices about how to better manage our City’s streets and parking supply to achieve both our transportation goals and our quality-of-life goals.

These choices will involve clear tradeoffs, and no doubt some of these choices will be controversial, but this is no excuse to sit back and do nothing. Instead, San Francisco should proceed as quickly as possible with the bold thinking and necessary changes to realize a progressive transportation vision for the city: a more convenient, efficient, humane, and economically-productive transportation system that a great city like San Francisco deserves.

This report has been written by Jay Primus and Jeremy Nelson, both associate project managers at Nelson\Nygaard Consulting Associates, a San Francisco-based transportation consulting firm. It was reviewed, debated, and approved as SPUR policy by the SPUR Board of Directors on January 18, 2006. The authors would like to acknowledge the many people who contributed ideas and valuable feedback for this report.

(end notes)
¹ This SPUR report was published in our September 2005 newsletter and is available on SPUR’s website at www.spur.org/documents/pdf/050901_report_01.pdf.

² As planning-level estimates, these financial projections are meant to illustrate the likely magnitude of Muni’s financial challenge for two different scenarios for Muni productivity improvement. They are based on MTC/ABAG projections for the region and mode splits calculated using the MTC year 200 Bay Area Travel Survey. These projections have been revised upward since SPUR’s September 2005 report to reflect recent cost increases (e.g., higher than expected overtime charges and higher than expected costs associated with the 3rd Street light rail project) and the expectation that higher fuel costs will persist. These financial projections are based on the following critical assumptions: a) Car trips in San Francisco will be maintained at 2005 levels and b) the mode share for all trips made in San Francisco by transit will shift from about 22 percent at present to about 27 percent by 2015. This will require approximately 1 million daily Muni boardings, up from the current boardings of about 700,000. The range of operating deficit is calculated using different productivities – the more productive Muni becomes, the less it will cost to meet these goals. It should also be noted that in a status quo scenario in which Muni’s share of all trips and its productivity did not change significantly, the magnitude of Muni’s financial crisis would remain roughly the same due to rising costs.

³ Muni’s current plans for improvement as of 2005 imply a productivity increase of about 5 percent by 2015 (to approximately 65 passengers per hour).

⁴ “Election Results: Consolidated Municipal Election – November 4, 2003.” San Francisco Department of Elections, 11/14/03. Accessed at www.sfgov.org/site/election_index.asp?id=19601.

⁵ In the 9-county Bay Area, the total yes vote for Regional Measure 2 was 57 percent. “Regional Measure 2 Passes.” Metropolitan Transportation Commission, 3/30/04. Accessed at http://www.mtc.ca.gov/legislation/rm2.htm.

⁶ “Bay Area voters support transportation choices, reject road measures.” Transportation and Land Use Coalition (TALC), 11/3/04. Accessed at www.transcoalition.org/c/2004measures_press_release.html.

⁷ “2004 Transit Ballot Measures.” Center for Transportation Excellence. Accessed at www.cfte.org/success/2004BallotMeasures.asp.

⁸ “2005 Transit Ballot Measures.” Center for Transportation Excellence. Accessed at www.cfte.org/success/2005BallotMeasures.asp.

⁹ The San Francisco Transportation Authority (SFCTA) projects that under current policies and practices, there will be approximately 269,000 new vehicle trips beginning or ending in San Francisco by the year 2025, a 9.6 percent increase in the number of cars traveling on existing city streets.

¹⁰ The citywide bicycle network is contained in the 2020 San Francisco Bike Plan approved by the Board of Supervisors in 2005. Voters approved the bus rapid transit network as part of Proposition K in 2003.

¹¹ It must be emphasized that while these multimodal transportation improvements may reduce vehicle capacity on certain key pedestrian, bicycle, and transit corridors, they have the potential to increase the total person capacity of these streets, thereby improving the overall efficiency of San Francisco’s limited transportation system.

¹² Congestion management is often called transportation demand management (TDM) by city planners. TDM policies generally work by reducing the marginal cost of using other modes like walking, bicycling, or public transit and increasing the marginal cost of driving. From a policy perspective, increasing the marginal cost of driving is much more effective than simply increasing the cost of owning a car. For example, implementing a local gas tax, increasing the commercial parking tax, or removing the current City subsidies for employee and public parking are preferable revenue-raising approaches when compared to one-time annual vehicle fees. This is because transportation economists have calculated that 80 to 90 percent of the costs of driving are “fixed costs” (often called “sunk costs”) that represent just the cost of owning the vehicle itself, irrespective of the number of trips taken or distance traveled. These costs include purchasing and financing, insurance, registration, and the like. Small increases to these “ownership costs” have very little effect on congestion management, while increases to the “operation costs” – through measures like congestion pricing and demand-responsive prices for parking have been proven to have significant effects on reducing vehicle trips, especially at peak travel periods. For more information, see Vukan R. Vuchic “Transportation for Livable Cities,” Center for Urban Policy Research, 1999. For more information on congestion pricing, see Todd Litman “Road Pricing: Congestion Pricing, Value Pricing, Toll Roads, and HOT Lanes” accessed at www.vtpi.org/tdm/tdm35.htm.

¹³ While located within the city limits, Executive Park is essentially a suburban-office park located in the southeastern edge of San Francisco near Monster Park (Candlestick). More info at www.sfexecutivepark.com/aerialmap.html.

¹⁴ The SF County Transportation Authority is currently pursuing funding to conduct a study of the feasibility of congestion pricing in San Francisco. However, San Francisco could realize much of the benefits of congestion pricing if bridge tolls in the Bay Area were converted from a flat price structure to a peak/off-peak price structure. In addition, the MTA could institute a fairly robust version of congestion pricing by charging demand-responsive prices for on-and off-street parking it controls, as well as a surcharge for entering or exiting downtown off-street parking garages during peak times. Supporters of congestion pricing (including significant operational savings for Muni’s surface transit vehicles) should not sit back and wait for a pending study: many of the benefits of congestion pricing can be realized in the short-term, with low-cost low-tech tools already at our disposal.

¹⁵ The existing commercial parking tax could be increased across-the-board, incrementally (e.g. a 2 percent increase every other year for the next 10 years), or selectively (e.g. where commuter-oriented, all-day parking is taxed at a higher rate than more productive short-term parking). Alternatively, existing loopholes in the parking tax could be closed. Regardless of the method, increasing the parking tax would be a more economically productive and environmentally sustainable way to raise revenue for transportation than a general downtown business tax increase.

¹⁶ It is important to note that the three approaches can conflict, so that some revenue measures may be judged equitable using one approach but inequitable when evaluated using another. Resolving these conflicts is the task of policy makers, but these approaches provide a framework for evaluating fairness and equity of new revenue sources.

¹⁷ Of course, Muni must also improve service for existing riders who have other travel options such as driving, and increase their market share among these so-called “choice riders”, so that transit is more attractive option than driving for more people.

¹⁸ The City Charter states: “The Mayor, the Board of Supervisors, and the Agency [MTA] diligently shall seek to develop new sources of funding for the Agency’s operations, including sources of funding dedicated to the support of such operations, which can he used to supplement or replace that portion of the Municipal Transportation Fund consisting of appropriations from the General Fund of the City and County. To the extent permitted by State law, the Agency may submit any proposal for increased or reallocated funding to support all or a portion of the operations of the Agency, including, without limitation, a tax or special assessment, directly to the electorate for approval without the further approval of the Mayor or the Board of Supervisors. The Agency shall be authorized to conduct any necessary studies in connection with considering, developing, or proposing such revenue sources.” Source: City Charter, Article 8, Section 109 (Municipal Transportation Authority: Additional Sources of Revenue). Added to San Francisco City Charter November 1999.

¹⁹ In 2005 the City Council of Redwood City granted the staff-level downtown parking manager the authority – without going back to the City Council – to adjust curb parking prices on a periodic basis to keep downtown parking occupancy at 85 percent. This was done in order to ensure there will always short-term curb parking available in their downtown area. The enabling legislation is based in full conformity with California statutory law and supported by established case law. Accountability is ensured by requiring the parking manager to report back to the City Council on an annual basis, and by the inclusion of language within the local enabling legislation emphasizing that the City Council can always rescind this authority.

²⁰ The Board of Supervisors rolled back the increase to $0.50 per hour, despite off-street parking prices that are significantly higher in downtown and most commercial districts throughout the City. For example, market rates charged by commercial parking operators for off-street parking downtown range from $6 to $10, but the City still charges $3 per hour for more convenient curb parking spaces.

²¹ This prohibition for time-specific periods is contained in Sec. 155 (g) of the City’s Planning Code: “In order to discourage long-term commuter parking, any off-street parking spaces provided for a structure or use other than residential or hotel in a C-3 District [greater downtown], whether classified as an accessory or conditional use, which are otherwise available for use for long-term parking by downtown workers shall maintain a rate or fee structure for their use such that the rate charge for four hours of parking duration is no more than four times the rate charge for the first hour, and the rate charge for eight or more hours of parking duration is no less than 10 times the rate charge for the first hour. Additionally, no discounted parking rate shall be permitted for weekly, monthly, or similar time-specific periods.”

²² Deferred maintenance not only leads to increased breakdowns that inconvenience Muni riders (acting as a form of “unscheduled service cuts”), but they can also lead to dangerous conditions that compromise the safety of both riders and operators and expose the City to increased risk of expensive litigation.

²³ The implementation of plans developed in the MTA service efficiency planning process should be expedited as much as possible. Because of Proposition K, the extension of the ½ cent transportation sales tax passed in 2003, the City has a significant amount of capital funding for transit improvement projects. If more capital funding were necessary, general obligation bonds, benefit assessment districts, or tax increment financing could finance the balance. Besides helping the City to meet its other long-term policy goals, transit service upgrades are worthwhile investments that increase City revenues in the long-term in two ways. First by improving access to private property, transportation investments increase property values. Secondly, by creating a more favorable business environment, transportation investments increase commercial activity. Thus, investments to improve Muni should be viewed as “priming the pump” for increasing property taxes and sales taxes, and leveraging the city’s global competitive position.

²⁴ In some cases, potential revenue measures would require a change to local law or state enabling legislation. Wherever changes in local or state law are known to be required, the likely process for making such changes is described. However, some of the proposed revenue measures may ultimately require legal changes that the authors are unaware of; but this doesn’t not mean that such measures – and the required changes to local law or creation of state-enabling legislation – should not be pursued. Finally, it should be noted that some of the revenue measures that are currently considered illegal in San Francisco under State law have been implemented in other California cities suggesting that these cities have arrived at a legallydefensible interpretation of state laws that enables them to implement the revenue measures; these examples are noted where applicable.

²⁵ Many of the proposals discussed below represent transportation best practices. They should be implemented on policy grounds even if final revenue estimates vary from the estimates presented in this report.